Passchendaele by Robin Prior

Author:Robin Prior
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780300221213
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2017-09-26T04:00:00+00:00

V

Immediately following the battle, Haig was inclined to put the best interpretation on what had occurred. He wrote in his diary late that day: ‘Our attack today was most successful on the left (French) and centre (XIV and XVIII Corps), but only a moderate advance was made on the right (XIX and II Corps). Many Germans have been killed.’35 When Haig had had time for further reflection he was less impressed. He was still happy with Cavan's achievements on the left, but he acknowledged the measure of failure in the centre, and was not impressed by Gough's attempt to play the Irish card as a means of explanation. He noted that these men had been used in a way that reduced them to exhaustion and that the artillery had failed to remove some of the major obstacles facing them.

Regarding events on the right, Haig discussed the operation with Jacob. He did not appear to dispute Jacob's (inaccurate) assertion that ‘a certain amount of important ground’ had been captured. But he did remark on the effectiveness of the enemy's artillery. And he noted Jacob's statement that for the moment II Corps would only attempt to advance hereafter by means of small-scale attacks, making piecemeal assaults on objectives such as Inverness Copse and Nonne Boschen.

In addition, Haig was starting to recollect his strong feelings against the initiation of attacks without regard to the effects of weather on artillery preparations. He wrote:

The cause of the failure to advance on the right centre of the attack of the Fifth Army is due, I think, to commanders being in too great a hurry!! Three more days should have been allowed in which (if fine and observation good) the artillery would have dominated the enemy's artillery and destroyed his concreted defences!36

It seems appropriate to comment that Haig was not saying anything about the causes of failure that he had not discerned before the attack was launched. And as not only a commander but the commander-in-chief, he had been well placed to prevent his subordinates from launching attacks in conditions where the artillery could not do its job. One ‘cause of failure’, in other words, was his refusal to act on his insight and assert his authority.

Gough too was reflecting on the battle. But his conclusions were at variance with Haig's. The Fifth Army commander was more inclined to blame his men than his own decision to attack in bad weather and so deny them the needed measure of artillery support. At a conference with his corps commanders on the 17th, he complained of the inability of the troops to hold on to the ground they had gained and speculated that it might be necessary to court-martial some ‘glaring instances’ of this type of behaviour by officers or NCOs.37 He also reached the remarkable conclusion that his divisions were being relieved in the line too soon, thus causing an unnecessary waste of fresh divisions. This practice must stop, he announced, ‘or we should run short of troops’.38

This was as far as Gough's reflecting went.

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